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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
WILLIAM J. HARBISON*
A large number of significant cases were reported during the survey
period dealing with various phases of domestic relations. The 1957
General Assembly enacted several statutes in the field which should
also be noted.
ADOPTION OF CHLDREN
Because of domestic difficulty which developed in the home of the
petitioning parents, petitions for adoption were denied in two re-
ported cases involving the same parties.1 In one of the cases2 custody
was granted to the Department of Public Welfare, which had inter-
vened, because the adoption was not perfected within the two-year
period prescribed by statute.3 The court pointed out that the adop-
tion proceedings are governed entirely by statute, and the statutory
requirements must be explicitly followed.
A petition for adoption was likewise dismissed in the second of the
cases4 and custody given to the Department. In this proceeding the
petitioning husband had withdrawn as a party because of the domestic
discord. The wife contended that the trial court erred in permitting
such withdrawal, alleging that the husband had contracted with her
to adopt the child. The Supreme Court held that even if such a con-
tract existed, it would not be enforced by the courts, and the adoption
could be accomplished only by statutory proceedings, not by private
contract. This holding is in accord with another recent case5 in which
it was held that the status of adoption can be achieved only through
compliance with the statutes and not by estoppel or agreement. The
court also stated that until a final decree of adoption has been entered,
adjudging that it is for the best interest of the child that the adoption
be granted, no legal rights arise in favor of any of the parties; the
child remains a ward of the court until the entry of a final decree.6
The 1957 General Assembly reenacted two statutes which because
of a defective caption had been ruled invalid in 1955 by the Attorney
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; former Editor-in-Chief, Vander-
bilt Law Review; member, Trabue & Sturdivant, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. Clements v. Morgan, 296 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1956); In re Clements Adop-
tion, 296 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1956).
2. Clements v. Morgan, supra note 1.
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36"124 (1956).
4. In re Clements Adoption, 296 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1956).
5. Couch v. Couch, 35 Tenn. App. 464, 248 S.W.2d 327 (E.S. 1951), noted in
Harbison, Domestic Relations-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV. 977
(1953).
6. TENN. CODE AwN. § 36-120 (1956).
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General.7 These statutes contain detailed provisions concerning the
consent of the natural parents of the child sought to be adopted or
for making such parents parties to the adoption proceedings where
their consent is not given.8 They also prescribe the procedure for
proper determination that a child has been abandoned,9 and provide
for out-of-state surrenders by natural parents before officials in their
native states.10
Another provision of the 1955 Public Acts which had been of doubt-
ful validity because of a technical defect" was reenacted. 12 This sec-
tion permits the adoptive parents to inherit from the adopted child
both real and personal property acquired from relatives of such
parents. It also precludes natural heirs of the adopted child from in-
heriting any part of the estate of the adoptive parents or the estates
of relatives of such parents. As pointed out in an earlier survey issue,13
the enactment of this section eliminates a few of the many perplexing
problems surrounding inheritance by and from adopted children; it
by no means covers all possible situations, and the Tennessee adoption
laws still leave many questions on the subject unanswered.
SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
The wide discretion of the trial courts in administering funds for
the support of children was illustrated in the case of Pruett v. Pruett.14
The wife had been granted a divorce and custody of the child of the
parties. The husband (her second) had been ordered to pay weekly
sums for her support and that of the child. He filed the present
petition seeking modification of the award upon grounds that the
mother had remarried, and requested that his payments for the
child be impounded for the future benefit of the child. It appeared
that the mother of the child and her present husband were both work-
ing, and that the mother received funds for the support of her other
children from her first husband. Accordingly the circuit judge re-
duced the weekly award and ordered the payments by the father of
7. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, cc. 320, 345; see Harbison, Domestic Relations-1955
Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REv. 1004, 1006 (1955).
8. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957. c. 345, TENN. CODE Am. § 36-108 (Supp. 1957).
9. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 292, TENN. CODE ANw. § 36-110 (Supp. 1957).
The former statutes had expressly provided that consent of a natural parent
was not necessary for adoption if he had previously, in proper proceedings,
been adjudged to have abandoned the child. The new statutes appear to
have omitted this provision, although the plain implication of the new sections
is that no such consent is necessary if there has been such adjudication.
10. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957. c. 1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-114 (Supp. 1957).
11. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 302; see Harbison, Domestic Relations-1955
Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REv. 1004, 1005 (1955); Tennessee Bar Proceed-
ings, Report of Adoption Laws Committee, 24 TENN. L. REv. 73 (1955).
12. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 345, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-126 (Supp. 1957).
13. Harbison, Domestic Relations-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAMD. L. REv.
1004, 1006 (1955).
14. 291 S.W.2d 278 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
19571 1083
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the child in question to be made to the clerk of the court, there t6
be held and. accumulated, subject to further orders of the court and
not to be disbursed to the mother. This action was taken in order to
insure that the child would actually receive the benefit of hi
father's contributions. The court-of appeals affirmed, pointing out that
the remarriage of the mother was proper ground for terminating any
payments for her support, and that payments for the benefit of the
child should be administered- for the child's best interests. There is
precedent for the decision, 15 and the result seems proper in view of the
fact situation outlined in the opinion.'6 1
In the case of Roble v. Roble,17 the wife had been awarded a divorce
and child custody. In the divorce-proceedings, however, she had not
asked for child support, allegedly because the father of the child
was then unemployed. Subsequently, she filed the present suit seek,
ing a support award, alleging and proving the father's ability to pay.
The circuit judge, however, held that he lacked jurisdiction to make
any award since the matter had not been dealt with in the original
action. The court of appeals reversed, pointing out that the divorce
decree did not sever the parent-child relation nor terminate the
father's obligations. Further, the express statutory provisions re-
taining custody and support matters before the trial court would seem
to leave no doubt as to the power of the court to enter a support order
at any time.' 8 There may be doubt in Tennessee that the court could
order alimony if not granted in the original action,' 9 but the same
rule is not applicable to support decrees.20
The rights of children in the estate of their father, following a
divorce between the parents, were treated in Chapman v. Tipton.2'
15. Graham v. Graham, 140 Tenn. 328, 204 S.W. 987 (1918); Dews v. Dews,
6 Tenn. Civ App. 154 (1915).
16. The courts have held that the burden of support must be equitably
distributed between parents, according to their resources and abilities. Rose
Funeral Home v. Julian, 176 Tenn. 534, 144 S.W.2d 755, 131 A.L.R. 858 (1940),
Accordingly, here the mother's earning capacity was considered adequate to
meet the child's current needs, and the father's contributions were impounded
for the future.
17. 295 S.W.2d 817 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
18. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-820 to -828 (1956). See Davenport v. Daven-
port, 178 Tenn. 517, 160 S.W.2d 406 (1942), pointing out that prior to the
enactment of these provisions in the 1932 Code, the court lost jurisdiction of
such matters unless the original decree expressly or impliedly retained the
cause before the court.
19. Darby, v. Darby, 152 Tenn. 287, 277 S.W. 894 (1925). (decided before
the 1932 Code was enacted), held that if a wife sues for divorce without per-
sonal service on her husband, she waives any right to alimony; whether this
rule would apply in view of the provisions enacted in 1932 has never been
decided. Those provisions retain questions of future support within control
of the court, and conceivably would permit a subsequent petition for alimony,
if, for good cause, none was-sought in the original proceedings.
20. See note 18 supra; see also Watkins v. Watkins, 194 Tenn, 621, 254 S.W.2d
735 (1953), discussed in Harbison, Domestic Relations-1953 Tennessee Survey,
6 VAN-. L. REv. 974, 981 (1953).
21. 292 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1956).
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When the divorce was obtained, the ,court did not assign homestead
rights to the wife, as might have been done under the statutes. m She
was given custody of the children Their father never remarried and
died intestate. The children claimed homestead in his realty and a
year's support in his personalty. These statutory rights are granted
to the widow of a decedent,23 but the statutes governing the year's
support expressly provide that "if therebe no widow . .. the same
provision shall be made for the children of the intestate, or of the
widow, or of both, under the age of fifteen (15).1"24 Likewise the
statutes on homestead expressly state that homestead shall "inure to
the benefit of the widow and children,"2 and that homestead in a
decedent's lands "inuring to the benefit of his widow or minor chil-
dren" shall be laid out in a specified manner.
26
I In an earlier case the Supreme Court had held that when the mother
obtains a divorce without having her homestead rights provided for in
the decree, she waives such rights, and neither she nor the minor
children thereafter may claim homestead in the husband's realty.
27
In that case, the court recognized that the father's duty of support con-
tinues after divorce but ordinarily does not survive his death. The
court accordingly denied all claims of the children in that case.
In the Chapman case, the Supreme Court merely reaffirmed its
former holding. The result seems clearly contrary to the language and
intent of the statutory provisions. It is interesting to note also that
in the earlier decision relied upon, the husband had remarried and
left a surviving widow. No such facts existed in the present 'case.
Accordingly the statutory provisions giving a year's ,Susport' to the
children "if there be no widow" Would seem clearly applitable.
LEGITImACY OF C-ILbREN
In the interesting case of Evans v. Young28 the effect of .a .Mississippi
statute legitimating the issue of slave marriages was considered. The
statute made the issue of such marriages "legitimate for all purposes.';2 9
Tennessee has a statute authorizing the children of Tennessee slave
marriages to inherit from their parents,30 but the statutehad formerly
been construed as not permitting collateral relatives of such.,'hildilen
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-824 (1956)., This section provides that when the
wife is granted a divorce, title to the homestead shall be vested ,in her by
the decree and upon her death it shall pass to the children. * I *
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-802 to -805 (1956) (year's support); TFv. CODE
AN. §§ 26-301 to -312, §§ 30-901 to -916 (1956) ,(homestead).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-805 (1956)
25, TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-301 (1956)
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-901 (1956)
27. Carey v. Carey, 163 Tenn.'486, 43 S.W,2d 498 (1931)
28. 299 S.W.2d 218 (Tenn. 1957).
29. Miss. Pub. Acts 1865, c. 4 § 8.
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-302 (1956).
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to inherit from them.3 ' Accordingly the Tennessee courts had held
that statutes of other states, purporting to legitimate issue of slave
marriages, would not be effective to confer a right of collateral in-
heritance in Tennessee, since the state had not conferred such right
on its own citizens of like status.32
In 1919, however, the Tennessee statutes were amended to provide
that collateral kindred of a deceased Negro should have full rights of
inheritance.3 The present Code so provides. 34
The Supreme Court in the present case held that as Tennessee has
now conferred a full right of collateral inheritance upon all legitimate
colored persons, regardless of whether or not they are children of
slave marriages, it should permit such inheritance from colored per-
sons legitimated in other states. It had previously been held in Ten-
nessee that this state will recognize the status of legitimacy conferred
by the laws of another state and will permit inheritance thereunder
to the same extent as under local legitimating provisions,35 although
it will not permit such foreign laws to create greater or different
rights than the local laws confer. The present holding is consistent
with this rule and carries out the apparent intention of the legislature
in broadening the right of inheritance.36
ANNULmENT, DIVORCE AND ALIMONY
Collection and Abatement of Alimony: The use of a ne exeat bond to
enforce alimony and child support provisions in a divorce decree was
illustrated in Orrick v. Orrick.37 The husband had failed on several
occasions to make the payments as ordered; finally the wife, fearful
that he would leave the jurisdiction, had him arrested under a writ
of ne exeat.38 He gave bond conditioned upon not leaving the state
or the jurisdiction of the court. When he violated the conditions, the
wife moved for and was granted judgment against the sureties. The
judgment was affirmed on appeal, the court holding that the sureties
were not discharged merely because the husband had been arrested
31. Sheperd v. Carlin, 99 Tenn. 64, 41 S.W. 340 (1897).
32. Cole v. Taylor, 132 Tenn. 92, 177 S.W. 61 (1915).
33. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1919, c. 14.
34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-303 (1956). In Wallace v. Berry, 6 Tenn. App.
248 (M.S. 1927) the Court of Appeals held that this provision conferred a
right of collateral inheritance upon all legitimate colored persons, including
the issue of Tennessee slave marriages.
35. Smith v. Mitchell, 185 Tenn. 57, 202 S.W.2d 979 (1947).
36. One of the justices, concurring, felt that the case should simply be dis-
posed of upon the basis of the broadened legislation, since the right of
collateral inheritance is conferred therein unconditionally and without refer-
ence to prior slave marriages. One justice dissented on the ground that the
statutes should apply only to descendants of Tennessee slave marriages, and
not to issue of non-residents.
37. 296 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1956).
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-108 (1956).
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and later released from jail since the execution of the bond. The
arrest had been for other violations of court orders and had not been
related to the ne exeat proceedings; the court held that the ne exeat
bond, unlike an ordinary bail bond, was not affected by the principal's
being placed in custody on other charges.
In the case of Daugherty v. Dixon the parties had been divorced in
1935, the decree requiring periodic alimony payments by the husband.
Three years later the wife remarried; there was never any modification
of the original decree and apparently no payments were made there-
under after December 1935. In 1956 the wife sued for the entire ac-
cumulated amount. In addition to pointing out that she was guilty
of laches, the court held that it had authority under the Tennessee
statutes to remit the entire amount of accumulated alimony and to
terminate all future payments; accordingly the suit was dismissed.
Tennessee has no code provisions automatically terminating alimony
payments upon remarriage of the wife, nor did the court in the present
case see fit to adopt such a rule by judicial decision. Unlike the rule
obtaining in many jurisdictions, however, it is well settled in Tennessee
that accrued alimony payments, as well as future payments, may be
modified or remitted.40 In the present case, the court exercised this
power to relieve the husband from an obviously inequitable claim.
The General Assembly enacted specific legislation to authorize the
recovery of attorneys' fees by the wife and the custodian of children
in proceedings to enforce the provisions of alimony and support de-
crees. 41 While many of the courts in Tennessee had been making
such allowances in practice, express authority therefor had not pre-
viously been made by statute. The practice varies widely in other
states, depending often upon the construction of local statutes.4 The
new Tennessee statute leaves the trial court wide discretion in allow-
ing such fees and in fixing the amount thereof.
Procedure and Jurisdiction: In addition to creating a new domestic
relations court for Davidson County,43 the General Assembly made
several general changes in divorce procedure throughout the state.
The cash deposit required in a divorce action filed by the wife under
the pauper's oath was increased slightly.44 Two statutes were enacted
dealing with the form of pleadings in divorce cases. By one of these,
the complainant is relieved from including "scurrilous or obscene"
39. 297 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-820 (1956); Gossett v. Gossett, 34 Tenn. App. 654,
241 S.W.2d 934 (W.S. 1951).
41. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 21, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-822 (Supp. 1957).
42. See generally 17 AM. Jum., Divorce and Separation §§ 640-45 (1957).
43. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957. c. 44.
44. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957. c. 20, TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1629 (Supp. 1957)
(raising the deposit from $6.00 to $10.00). A husband may not proceed under
the pauper's oath in divorce cases in Tennessee.
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allegations in the complaint, although upon motion by the. defendant
the court may-subsequently require.complete details of the complaint
to be specified.45 The other statute requires that the complaint shall
contain detailed data concerning the names, residences and ages of
the parties and their children, and the previous marital status of the
parties,.46 For failure to include the required information without good
cause the complaint may be dismissed.
,An important provision dealing with annulment of marriages was
enacted.47 This statute expressly, authorizes service of process in
annulment cases by subpoena or by publication, as in divorce cases.
Heretofore there had been doubt, as to the propriety of proceeding in
annulment suits by publication, especially since appellate decisions on
the' matter were lacking in this state. The authorities from other
states are in conflict upon the point.48 The new provision therefore
removes an area of uncertainty heretofore existing in practice.
Another important statutory change reduced the residence require-
ment from two years to one year before suit for divorce may be brought
upon a cause of action arising in a foreign jurisdiction prior to the
removal of the complainant to Tennessee.
49
Cancellation of Decree: In the case of Martin v. Martin,50 a husband
while in military service in Tennessee had obtained an ex parte
divorce from his wife, who resided in Pennsylvania and did not know
of' the proceedings. The husband was thereafter transferred over-
seas. Upon learning of the divorce decree, the wife promptly filed
suit in Tennessee to have it cancelled for fraud. Service was obtained
by publication, and the chancellor cancelled the decree of divorce. The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Tennessee had jurisdiction over
the marriage by virtue of the husband's having submitted the marriage
to the courts of this state. There remained therefore "some sort of
res" within the jurisdiction, even after the husband had departed, The
court emphasized the obvious hardship and inequity upon the wife if
jurisdiction were declined, since it would be impossible for her to
obtain, personal service upon her husband in any state to have the
fraud corrected. The case is one of first impression in the state,51
but the result seems to be sound.
45. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 46, TN. CODE Asl. § 36-805 (Supp. 1957).
40. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 74, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-805 (Supp. 1957).
47.-Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 100, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-834 (Supp. 1957).
48. See 35 Am. JUl., Marriage § 75 (1941); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1086. (1955).
49. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 274, TEDM. CODE ANN. § 36-803 (Supp. 1957).
50. 292 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. 1956).
51. A similar suit for relief was filed in Rose v. Rose, 176 Tenn. .680, 145
S.W.2d 773 (1940), but there the party committing the fraud had died. Since
his death terminated the marriage and he had left no property to be disposed
of, the court held that there was no res left for it to act upon. It indicated
in dictum that relief would have been granted if the spouse committing the
fraud were still alive, and that jurisdiction could be obtained by publication.
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Right to Remarry: The effect of a prohibition against remarriage in a
foreigndivorce decree was treated in Stephenson v. Steplenson.5 2
The husband had obtained a divorce from his %wife in:Alabama and the
decree had permitted him. to remarry but had denied such right to the
wife. Thereafter, in violation of the decree, she married in Georgia.
When her second husband later died in Tennessee, the legality; of the
marriage was raised in a contest overher :right to administer the
estate. There was no evidence that her remarriage was, celebrated
in Georgia for the mere purpose of evading the laws either of-Alabama
or of Tennessee. Accordingly the Tennessee court declined to give
effect to the prohibition contained in the divorce decree, and held the
subsequent marriage valid. The result is in accord with the majority
rule that extraterritorial effect will not be given, decrees or statutes
limiting the right of remarriage.
5 3
Res Adjudicata: In two protracted divorce proceedings, the principle
of re6s :adjudicata was applied by the courts. In the first of' these,
the wife had been granted a decree of separate maintenance, and the
husband's cross-bill for divorce had been dismissed Iin 1935:. There-
after there were numerous unsuccessful petitions and suits by the
husbhaid throughout the next twenty years, seeking a divorce on
grounds of desertion, or in the alternative praying that the collrt grant
a divorce to the wife on grounds of "public policy" so as to teriinate
the unsuccessful marriage. The court of appeals under' the present
petition by the husband entered an absolute divorce in favor of the
wife. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prior unappealed
decrees had settled all issues insofar as the husband's claims were
concerned, and holding that no doctrine of "public policy" demanded
that the wife be forced to accept a divorce if she did not so desire,
when she was living apart from her husband under a valid decree of
separate maintenance.
In Gracey v. Gracey55 a proposed property settlement between the
parties had been submitted to the trial court in connection with divorce
proceedings. The court had approved all of the settlement except one
provision directing certain payments by the wife to the husband;
this provision he had disapproved. The husband then filed the'present
suit seeking to collect those payments from the wife pursuant to their
original agreement. Both the trial and appellate courts sustained
a plea of res adjudicata, inasmuch as the property rights of the 'parties
had clearly been considered and adjudicated in the earlier proceedings.
52. 298 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
53. 17 Am. Jun., Divorce and Separation § 461 (1957); see also Anhot., 47
A.L.R.2d 1393, 1405 (1956).
54. Perrin v. Perrin, 299 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1957).




In three cases reported during the survey period, decrees of separate
maintenance were involved. In two of them a trial court had granted
separate maintenance to the wife and had denied divorce to the hus-
band.5 6 In each case the husband thereafter moved the court to make
the "divorce" absolute. In both cases the Supreme Court held that a
decree of separate maintenance is unlike a divorce a mensa et thoro,
which can be made into an absolute divorce upon a showing of cause.
In each of the cases under consideration, the wife had not sought any
kind of divorce but only an equity decree for separate maintenance.
Such a proceeding is not brought pursuant to the divorce code and
relief therein is granted under inherent chancery power, being availa-
ble often when the requirements of the divorce code cannot be met
by the petitioner.5 7 Accordingly in each case the Supreme Court held
that it would not be proper for the trial court to undertake to grant
an absolute divorce in a separate maintenance suit, even though it
appeared that the parties were irreconcilable.5 8
In the case of Elrod v. Elrod59 the husband sued for divorce, and
the wife filed a cross-action for separate maintenance. The court of
appeals held that the evidence entitled the husband to a divorce on
grounds of cruelty, but his bill was dismissed for noncompliance with
the state residence requirements. Because of the inequitable conduct
of the wife, however, she was denied separate maintenance. The court
held that because of her conduct, the husband was entitled to live
separate from her, and therefore owed her no duty of support.
PRESUmPTION IN FAVOR OF SECOND MARRIAGE
In the case of Rutledge v. Rutledge60 the primary defense raised by
the husband in an action by his wife for divorce was that he had pre-
viously been married and that the prior marriage had not been dis-
solved. His testimony, however, showed that both he and his former
wife had lived in various places in other states and that his former
56. Perrin v Perrin, 299 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1957); Stephenson v. Stephenson,
298 S.W.2d 717 (Tenn. 1957).
57. E.g., Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608 (1906) (separate
maintenance allowed although residence requirement for limited divorce not
fulfilled); Bevil v. Bevil, 8 Tenn. App. 490 (W.S. 1928) (wife unable to estab-
lish grounds for divorce may be granted separate maintenance in later pro-
ceeding, the two remedies being "entirely distinct").
58. In each case the husband invoked the rule of Lingner v. Lingner, 165
Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749 (1933). In that case it was held that in an action
for limited divorce, the court could, in its discretion, grant an absolute divorce
if the parties were irreconcilable, pointing out the hardship and undesirability
of long continued separations. In each of the present cases, however, the
Supreme Court declined to extend this "public policy" rule to separate main-
tenance actions.
59. 296 S.W.2d 849 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956), cert. denied, reh. denied, 296
S.W.2d 856 (Tenn. 1956).
60. 293 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
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wife had herself remarried prior to defendant's entering into his pres-
ent marriage. He produced certificates from the chancery court clerks
of two counties in Mississippi that there were no records of dissolution
of defendant's prior marriage in their courts. Both the trial court and
the court of appeals, however, held that there is a very strong presump-
tion that before a second marriage is entered into, the former marriage
has been lawfully terminated.61 The evidence in the present case was
held insufficient to rebut the presumption, particularly in view of the
trial court's statement that the husband was not a credible witness.62
ACTIONS FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM
The husband's action for loss of consortium caused by tort to the
wife was dealt with briefly in two cases reported during the survey
period. In Spence v. Came,63 a jury verdict in favor of the wife for
personal injuries in an automobile accident was affirmed. The hus-
band had sued for property damage to his automobile and for his
wife's medical expenses. He had stayed at home and cared for his
wife personally instead of hiring outside help. In his suit, however,
he made no allegations concerning his loss of time or loss of con-
sortium. His property damages and medical expenses totalled $2,462.71.
The jury awarded him $3,000. The court of appeals held that the
verdict must be reduced to the actual expenses proved, and that noth-
ing should be allowed for the husband's loss of time or loss of con-
sortium.
The holding seems unduly restrictive, although it might be justified
by a strict reading of the pleadings. As pointed out in the other
reported case during the period,64 in which the wife alleged personal
injury because of malicious prosecution, the action for loss of con-
sortium is well recognized in Tennessee and was not abolished by the
emancipation of married women. And the same court which ordered
the remittitur in the Spence case had only recently held that a jury
award to the husband for "mental anguish" might well be interpreted
as being an allowance for loss of consortium and thereby sustained.
It would seem that unless the pleadings absolutely precluded the
husband's claims in the Spence case, therefore, the modest award
made to him should have been sustained.
61. See generally Payne v. Payne, 142 Tenn. 320, 219 S.W. 4 (1919); Gamble
v. Rucker, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S.W. 499 (1911); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 7 (1950).
62. Little stress was given to the fact that the former wife of defendant had
herself remarried. The proof of this marriage would seem to add strength
to the presumption that defendant's former marriage had been dissolved.
63. 292 S.W.2d 438 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
64. Dunn v. Alabama Oil & Gas Co., 299 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
65. Scott v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 286 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1954), 24 TENN. L. REv. 602 (1956).
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ThNAicy BY THE ENTBETY
::The cisd of Moore v. C6e 6 was another of the many cases involving
unsettled titles in Tennessed during the so-called "Bejach" period from
1913 to- 19f9. As discussed in an earlier survey issue,67 a deed to hus-
band and wife duririg these years, because of an unfortunate misinter4
pFetafion of the Married Women's Emancipation Act of 19f13,68 had
the effect of creating a tenancy in common rather than a 'tnancy:by
fhe entirety.6 9 The deed in the present case was executed in 1914.
Adhering to its former rulings on the subject, the Supreme Court held
that only a tenancy in common was created, and upon the death of
the wife her one-half interest passed to her heirs. The rights of these
heirs were held unaffected by later conveyances in which the husband
sought to create a tenancy by the entirety in the whole tract in, him-
self and his second wife. Both the husband and his second wife were
found to be acting in good faith and in the belief that he owned fee
simple title to the entire property by survivorship.
The unfortunate effects of the holding by the Supreme Court in
19f870 that the General Assembly had abolished tenancy by thd en.
tirety in enacting the emancipatory legislation, are coming more and
more to be felt. A generation has passed since the decision; and it is
to be expected that an increasing number of cases will arise during the
next few years growing out of titles created during the 1913-1919
interval. At this late date, however, it would probably only add to the
complexities of the situation if the court were to overrule its 1918
decision, and retroactive legislation at this time might encounter
insurmountable constitutional problems.
In Waddy v. Wcddy"' rights of an individual creditor of a tenant
by the entirety were considered. The creditor held judgment against
the husband alone, and a nulla bona return had been made on execu-
tion: The present suit was filed to subject to the judgment the interest
6f the husband in realty owned by the entirety with his wife. The
chancellor ordered a sale of the husband's interest, subject to his
homestead right. The Supreme Court affirmed, pointing out that
if the wife survived, the purchaser of the husband's interest would
take nothing; if the husband survived, the purchaser would take.the
fee, subject to certain prior mortgage indebtedness on the land.
Perhaps the most important case dealing with tenancy by the
66. 289 S.W.2d 695 (Tenn. 1956).
67. Harbison, Domestic Relations-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV.
990 (1956).
68. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1913, c. 26; Gill v. McKinney, 140 Tenn. 549, 205 S.W. 416
(1918),
69. The estate was expressly restored by legislation in 1919 and has existed
since that'time. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1919, c. 126, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-602 (1956).
70. Gill v. McKinney, 140 Tenn. 549, 205 S.W. 416 (1918).
71. 291 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1956).
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ettirety ,dhring the survey period- was- Preston. v, .3mith,7 2 In this
decisiqn: the court. of appeals -held, that am. estate gf tenancy by, the
enti±ety dannot arise by mere joint adverse, possession of real estate
by a husband and wife, unaccompainied- by any sort pf deed or muni
ment :of. title. Such possession,- continued for over twenty-one years,
was -held. to. create only a tenancy in, Common. between the parties.
The, co.urt -refused to enlarge. the usual presumption of .lost grant
arising out of twenty years? adverse possession to the point of pre-
suming, that such grant would have been of an estate by the. entirety.
The case was one -of first impression inthe state. It has been criti-
c'zed,-7 and the result seems somewhat contrary to the extremely
liberal attitude of.the Tennessee courts generally toward the creation
of tenancy .by the entirety.7'4
HUSBAND AND WIFE
n 'the case of In re Estate: of Tempeton7 5 a wife had signed a note
Of her hUSiband as accommodatiion maker. Upon his death she was
compelled to pay the entire note. The court held that she was entitled
to reimbursement out of her husband's estate for her expenditures.
There' is no rule in Tennessee prohibiting a wife from becoming
surety upon her husband's debts. In many states such a prohibition
obtai'ns as an incident to the emancipation legislation7 6 Since, there-
fore, the wife may become a surety in Tennessee, she should be entitled
to all of the remedies of a surety, among which reimbursement is of
primary importance.
PARENT AND CHILD
In Lakins v. Isley77 a husband and wife had been divorced, with
custody of their child given to the wife. The wife thereafter was
killed in an accident, and the child went to live with her maternal
grandmother. The father of the child qualified as administrator
72., 293 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955), 24 TENN. L. REV. 892 (1957), 10
VAND. L. REV. 460 (1957).
73. 24 TENN. L. REV. 892, 899 (1957).
74. See., e.g., Oliphant v. McAmis, 197 Tenn. 367, 273 S.W.2d 151 (1954)
(personalty registered in husband's name but acquired through joint efforts
held to be owned by the entirety); Sloan v. Jones, 192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W.2d
506 (1951) (bank account in name of husband or wife). See Harbison, Domes-
tic Relati6ns.-:-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VA=. L. REV. 990, 998 (1956). Even
the Tennessee General Assembly once recognized a rather unconventional
and unorthodox method of creating a tenancy by the entirety by providing
for such an estate to arise upon a deed from one spouse to the other of "a
one-half undivided interest" in realty. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1949, c. 255. This
provision has now been modified to require a direct conveyance to the other
spouse expressing the intention to create the tenancy. TENx. CODE ANN.
§ 64-109 (1956).
75. 300 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. 1957).
76. See generally 26 Am. Jun., Husband and Wife §§ 211-20 (1940).
77. 292 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn. 1956).
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of his former wife's estate and filed suit for wrongful death. The
grandmother sought to have him removed as administrator, since
she was closely related to the deceased while the divorced husband
had no relationship whatever to her. The Supreme Court pointed
out, however, that neither the grandmother nor the divorced hus-
band would share in the wrongful death proceeds. These would belong
solely to the child. Accordingly the father of the child was granted
the right to administer the estate and prosecute the suit.
The 1957 General Assembly modified the general rule of non-
liability on the part of a parent for tort of his child by providing that
a parent or guardian should be liable for property damage inflicted
by his child under eighteen years of age, provided that the damage
is done "maliciously or willfully" and provided that the child is
living with the parent or guardian.78 The statute restricts recovery
to actual damages, however, and limits liability to three hundred
dollars and court costs. A complete defense is provided "if the
parent or guardian of the person show due care and diligence in his
care and supervision of such minor child."
The General Assembly provided that in proceedings involving the
issue of paternity of a child, the court may, upon motion of the
alleged father, require the alleged father, the mother and the child
to submit to blood grouping tests to determine whether the defendant
can be excluded as being the father.7 9 The results of the tests are
admissible in evidence only where exclusion is established.
The General Assembly also created the Division of Juvenile Proba-
tion to operate within the Department of Correction.80 This Division
is designed to handle problems of probation of juvenile offenders and
to place such problems in the hands of specially qualified and trained
personnel.
The General Assembly also clarified the procedure of appeal from
the juvenile court to the circuit court.81 The new statute allows five
days for appeal and expressly authorizes trial de novo in the circuit
court. The circuit court is directed to remand the case after decision
to the juvenile court for enforcement of the judgment.
78. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 76, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1001 to -1003 (Supp.
1957).
79. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957. c. 30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-716 (Supp. 1957).
80. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 278, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-901 to -909 (Supp.
1957).
81. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 315, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-273 (Supp. 1957).
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